06/04/2026
By Karen Mullins
The School of Criminology and Justice Studies is proud to announce a Dissertation Defense by Lauryn J. Krebs entitled, "The Threat of Cyber-Laundering: An Evaluation of the Security Landscape and Vulnerability of Crypto Exchanges."
Date: Wednesday, June 24, 2026
Time: 11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
Location: 431 Heath and Social Sciences Building and via Zoom
Committee:
- James Forest, Ph.D., Professor, School of Criminology and Justice Studies, UML, (Chair)
- Emily Greene-Colozzi, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, School of Criminology, UML
- Claire Lee, Ph.D., Associate Professor School of Criminology and Justice Studies, UML
- Amber Ruf, Ph.D., Associate Professor, School of Criminology and Justice Studies, UML
Abstract:
New innovations have allowed for criminals to use cryptocurrencies to launder their criminal profits; this process has been dubbed “cyber-laundering.” Cyber-laundering occurs in the context of the crypto exchange, the online money exchange businesses where individuals can exchange between fiat currency and cryptocurrencies. Cyber-criminals take advantage of security weaknesses within crypto exchanges to pseudonymously engage in the layering of illicitly obtained profits through various cryptocurrency transactions, and end with laundered fiat profits to continue their operations. This is of concern for both law enforcement (who do not want the continuation of criminal activity) and the crypto exchanges (who do not want to be held legally liable for that criminal activity). The goal of this dissertation is to examine the current effectiveness of the regulatory landscape through the lens of situational crime prevention, placing special consideration on regulation compliance, mechanisms of crime prevention, and mechanisms of vulnerability. This dissertation has uncovered several important findings. While the regulatory landscape is becoming more robust, countries are not adopting regulation at the same rate, leaving gaps that allow crypto-exchanges to choose how they are regulated. Crypto-exchanges are exposed to a wide variety of different crimes, especially those that allow for the exploitation of victims. A surprising finding was that both cyber-laundering and terrorist financing occurred less likely than predicted. This dissertation also presents the Crypto-Exchange Crime Prevention Model and the acronym CLAMS, both analytical frameworks that can be utilized to understand the crypto-exchange crime prevention process and the mechanisms that make crypto-exchanges vulnerable to cyber-laundering, respectively.