06/03/2025
By Ye Zhu
The Manning School of Business Department of Accounting invites you to attend a doctoral dissertation defense by Ph.D. student Ye Zhu on “The Impact of Subordinate Managers’ Monitoring on Non-GAAP Reporting.”
Candidate name: Ye Zhu
Defense Date: Tuesday, June 17, 2025
Time: 9 to 11 a.m.
Location: The meeting will be held online.
Dissertation Title: The Impact of Subordinate Managers’ Monitoring on Non-GAAP Reporting
Committee Members
- Karim Khondkar (Chair), Department of Accounting, Manning School of Business, UMass Lowell
- Jingrong (Karen) Lin, Department of Accounting, Manning School of Business, UMass Lowell
- Huimin (Amy) Chen, Department of Accounting, Manning School of Business, UMass Lowell
- Chi Zhang, Department of Finance, Manning School of Business, UMass Lowell
Abstract:
This study investigates the relationship between subordinate executives' monitoring and non-GAAP reporting. Using the average subordinate compensation related to that of the CEO as a proxy for subordinate executives' monitoring, I find that subordinate executives' monitoring effectively improves non-GAAP reporting informativeness by curbing the CEO’s opportunistic behavior. The results are robust to alternative measures of subordinate executives' monitoring and alternative non-GAAP reporting quality tests. In cross-sectional analyses, I find that subordinate executives with longer horizons are more likely to enhance non-GAAP reporting quality. Further, I examine specific settings where CEOs are more likely to exhibit myopic behavior and find that the effect of subordinate executives' monitoring is stronger for firms with higher corporate opacity, greater complexity, and weaker external monitoring. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the critical role subordinate executives play in influencing CEOs' decisions, particularly in curbing opportunistic presentation of non-GAAP earnings.