Manning Operations & Information Systems - Speaker Series - Dr. Xiang Fang

The Operations & Information Systems (OIS) department Research Seminar Committee, in collaboration with the Business School, Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), cordially invites you to attend the research talk by Prof. Xiang Fang on February 11th 11:00 to 12:30 pm as part of the Manning Operations & Information Systems Speaker Series for Spring 2022. Look forward to you joining us for this talk.

 Zoom Link: https://wpi.zoom.us/j/8389374249

Dr. Xiang Fang is an associate professor in Supply Chain and Operations Management at UWM. She earned her PhD in Operations Research from Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. Dr. Fang’s research interests include supply chain management, applied game theory, sustainability, operations-marketing interface, machine learning, and healthcare analytics.

Dr. Fang is an Associate Editor for Omega, and she is on the editorial review boards of Production and Operations Management and Decision Sciences. Her research has appeared in top-tier and well-regarded journals including Management Science, Production and Operations Management, Decision Sciences, Naval Research Logistics, European Journal of Operational Research, etc.

Title: The Effect of List Price on Channel Performance with Consignment

Abstract: Motivated by the newest contract offered by Amazon.com, called the Advantage Program, we study a supply chain where a retailer offers a vendor-managed inventory with consignment contract to n suppliers for selling their products. A key parameter in the contract is the product list price that the retailer allows each supplier to choose for its own product. The retailer then sets the retail price of each product at or below its list price for selling it to the market and remits its supplier an amount equal to a prespecified percentage of its list price on each unit sold. Two alternative consignment contracts are also considered with only one deviation where the retailer chooses the retail price of each product freely, or the retailer sets the retail price of each product at or above its list price. We show that the supplier’s list price plays a major role in determining firms’ decisions and performance in equilibrium. In particular, we find that by committing the retail price of each product to not exceeding the list price set by its supplier, the retailer can improve its own performance and the channel performance without hurting each supplier

Organized by the OIS Dept. Research Seminar Committee: Yao Chen, Amit Deokar, JM Song, Harry ZhuThis talk is jointly hosted with the Business School, Worcester Polytechnic Institute